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SENTENCING ENHANCEMENT FOR AGGRAVATING ROLE:
THE NEED FOR THE NUMEROSITY TEST AS THE LEGAL
STANDARD FOR THE “OTHERWISE EXTENSIVE”
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY DETERMINATION
Nicole Borczyk†

I.

INTRODUCTION

The federal sentencing system for criminal cases has garnered much debate and
conversation throughout our history. For most of the twentieth century, the
discussion concerned the immense discretion and power federal judges had in
determining a federal criminal defendant’s sentence.1 Judges relied upon all pertinent
information2 in their sentencing determinations, and that information was “not
subject to procedural constraints such as the rules of evidence or standards of proof.”3
Furthermore, judges did not have to explain the reasons or evidence that provided the
basis for their sentencing judgments, and the sentences were, for the most part, not
subject to appellate review.4 Until the early 1980s, the only limitation placed on the
judge’s discretion was the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed by Congress—
judges could not impose a sentence that exceeded the statutory maximum penalty.5
Another point of discussion concerned the indeterminate nature of the sentences
imposed.6 Although the judge imposed a sentence in court, the United States Parole
Commission and the Federal Bureau of Prisons largely determined the time actually
served by the convicted, not the judge.7 The Parole Commission also had wide
† J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2019; B.A. in Political Science and International Political
Economy, Fordham University, 2016. I would like to extend my thanks to Professor Richard Garnett, for
providing his invaluable insight, to the Notre Dame Journal of Legislation, for all of their assistance, and to my
family for all of their thoughts and encouragement in pursuing this subject.
1 See JULIE R. O’SULLIVAN, FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME: CASES AND MATERIALS 109 (6th ed.
2016).
2 This consisted of any information the judge thought was relevant in determining a sentence, including
the defendant’s conduct regarding the current offense, past misconduct, background, history, characteristics,
etc.
3 O’SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 109.
4 See Brent E. Newton & Dawinder S. Sidhu, The History of the Original United States Sentencing
Commission, 1985-1987, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1167, 1169–70 (2017).
5 See O’SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 109; Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform:
The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 225 (1993).
6 See Newton & Sidhu, supra note 4, at 1171; Stith & Koh, supra note 5, at 226–27.
7 See Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 884 (1990) (“[S]entences pronounced by the court were, with rare exception,
never served: twelve years meant four, eighteen meant six, thirty meant ten.”); Newton & Sidhu, supra note 4,
at 1170; Fifteen Years of Guidelines Sentencing: An Assessment of How Well the Federal Criminal Justice
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discretion in its early release determinations.8 Due to the wide, seemingly unchecked
discretion afforded to both judges and to the Parole Commission, “significant
sentencing disparities among similarly situated [defendants]” resulted,9 and the
federal sentencing system for criminal cases was a system of “indeterminate
sentencing.”10
Congress responded by enacting the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“the SRA”)
that revolutionized the federal sentencing system.11 The SRA established the United
States Sentencing Commission, and one of its tasks was to formulate sentencing
guidelines.12 By establishing clear guidelines, Congress sought to limit judicial
discretion and to instill transparency, proportionality, certainty, consistency, and
fairness into the sentencing system.13 Once completed, the Sentencing Commission
intended for the Sentencing Guidelines to have two effects: first, to promote
uniformity, proportionality, predictability, and certainty in federal criminal
sentencing; and second, to assure that the punishment imposed appropriately serves
the purposes14 of sentencing that the SRA set forth.15 In essence, the Guidelines set
the rules and the procedure16 that judges are to follow in order to determine the

System Is Achieving the Goals of Sentencing Reform, 17 FED. SENT’G REP. 269, 269 (Apr. 2005) [hereinafter
Fifteen Years of Guidelines Sentencing].
8 See PETER B. HOFFMAN, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL PAROLE SYSTEM 6–7 (2003),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/uspc/legacy/2009/10/07/history.pdf.
9 See Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 535 (2013); see also Nagel, supra note 7, at 883.
10 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989); see also ALLEN, STUNTZ, HOFFMAN,
LIVINGSTON, LEIPOLD, & MEARES, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ADJUDICATION AND RIGHT TO COUNSEL 1498–500
(2d ed. 2016) [hereinafter ADJUDICATION AND RIGHT TO COUNSEL].
11 See George L. Blum, Annotation, Construction and Application of U.S.S.G., § 3B1.1(a), 18 U.S.C.A.,
Providing Sentencing Enhancement for Organizer or Leader of Criminal Activity—Drug Offenses, 43 A.L.R.
Fed. 2d 365 § 2 (2017).
12 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1) (2012).
13 See
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N,
FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS 1
(2015),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-projects-andsurveys/miscellaneous/201510_fed-sentencing-basics.pdf; see also Nagel, supra note 7, at 902–04; Fifteen
Years of Guidelines Sentencing, supra note 7, at 269.
14 The purposes of sentencing are retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2) (2012).
15 See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (2012); Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 264 (2012); U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.3 (2016) [hereinafter GUIDELINES MANUAL]; see also
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 13, at 1.
16 First, the judge determines which Chapter Two offense guideline applies to the case at issue by
consulting Appendix A of the Guidelines Manual. Second, the judge calculates the “offense level” from that
guideline by considering both the applicable “base offense level” and any “specific offense characteristics”
based upon the relevant conduct provisions discussed in Chapter One. Specific offense characteristics are
“aggravating and mitigating factors [that are] related to a particular offense type.” In example, for unlawful
possession of a firearm, offense involved more than three firearms, firearm was stolen, and firearm serial
number was altered, to list a few. Third, the judge determines if any additional “adjustments” to the offense
level are warranted from the Chapter Three provisions. Adjustments include “general aggravating and
mitigating factors that are common across offense types.” For example, acceptance of responsibility, use of
minor in committing a crime, hate crime, and abuse of position of trust, to list a few. Fourth, the judge calculates
the offender’s “criminal history points” according to the provisions in Chapter Four and places the offender in
a criminal history category. Fifth, the judge identifies the sentencing guideline range in the Chapter Five
Sentencing Table by locating the cell in the table where the offender’s offense level and criminal history
category intersect. Lastly, the judge contemplates all potential grounds for a “departure” or “variance” from
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applicable sentencing range set out in the sentencing table.17 As originally enacted,
the resulting guideline range was mandatory––judges were required to sentence
within the calculated range.18
From 1987 through 2005, the conversation mainly focused on the mandatory
nature of the newly enacted Sentencing Guidelines. Judges were required, except in
extraordinary cases, to sentence within the narrow range provided after completing
the procedure. Arguments surfaced regarding the inflexible nature of the Guidelines,
the restriction the Guidelines had on human discretion, the resulting shift in power
from the judge to the prosecutor in regards to sentencing, the removal of humanity
and individualization aspects of sentencing, and the potential Sixth Amendment
violation that resulted from forced sentencing requirements.19 The Supreme Court
responded in United States v. Booker20 and held that the mandatory nature of the
Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment.21 As a result, the Guidelines
have become only advisory and a required starting point. 22
Today, the SRA requires judges to consider the Sentencing Guidelines in
conjunction with other sentencing factors to arrive at an appropriate sentence for the
applicable offense and defendant.23 In other words, judges still must follow the
procedure set out in the Guidelines to arrive at a range but are then allowed to tailor
the sentence based upon other statutory concerns.
Nevertheless, the Sentencing Guidelines are still the subject of considerable
discussion over a wide array of issues. Some of the issues arise out of the ambiguity
in the language of its provisions and the resulting confusion in its application. This
Note will examine the debate that surrounds the Chapter Three aggravating role
adjustment provision for serving as either a leader or organizer of “otherwise
extensive” criminal activity that raises the base offense level by four levels, or a
supervisor or manager of “otherwise extensive” criminal activity that raises the base
offense level by three levels. The debate derives from the ambiguity surrounding
what constitutes “otherwise extensive” criminal activity, and thus, when the
adjustment should apply.
This Note will argue that the numerosity test ought to be the legal standard for
determining “extensiveness.” Part I provides an introduction to the problems and
debate that surrounds the federal sentencing system and a general introduction to the
Sentencing Guidelines. Part II provides a brief overview of the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984 and a more in-depth explanation of the Sentencing Guidelines. Part III
the applicable guideline range by consulting the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors set out in the SRA. U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N, supra note 13, at 15–16 (emphasis added).
17 Id. at 15–20.
18 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2012).
19 O’SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 109.
20 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
21 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) was deemed unconstitutional, and was severed and excised from the SRA. Id.
at 245.
22 See Diona Howard-Nicolas, Comment, Negotiated Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Cure for the
Federal Sentencing Debacle, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 665, 666 (2013).
23 See Barbara J. Van Arsdale, Annotation, Construction and Application of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a)
Providing Sentencing Enhancement for Organizer or Leader of Criminal Activity—Fraud Offenses, 32 A.L.R.
Fed. 2d 445 § 2 (2017).

262

Journal of Legislation

[Vol. 44:2]

examines the sentencing enhancement provision for an aggravating role in “otherwise
extensive” criminal activity and its context within the structure and purpose of the
Guidelines. Part IV discusses two legal standards used to determine “otherwise
extensive” criminal activity that currently divide the circuits. In Part V, I will argue
that the numerosity test ought to be the legal standard. I will incorporate both the
language of the provision, the goals and purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines, and
the structure of the Sentencing Guidelines to support my argument. Lastly, the
Conclusion will summarize this analysis.
II. SENTENCING REFORM ACT OF 1984 AND THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES
Prior to the enactment of the SRA, the federal sentencing system was largely
unregulated.24 There were no procedural limitations on the evidence considered by
judges at the sentencing hearings. Judges evaluated all information deemed relevant
to the sentencing determination.25 Furthermore, judges were not required to provide
a justification explaining the reasons for their sentencing decision,26 and their
decisions were virtually unreviewable by an appellate court.27 The only limit was
that the sentence imposed fit within the statutory minimum and maximum established
by Congress. Wide disparities among similarly situated defendants resulted––the
sentence a defendant received greatly depended on which judge the defendant came
before.28
This disparity was exacerbated by the wide discretion the Parole Commission
and the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) had in ultimately determining when a
defendant would be released from prison. The BOP awarded “good time
allowances”––which reduced the length of time served relative to the term of
imprisonment imposed by the district court judge––to federal prisoners who earned
them for good behavior during their incarceration.29 These good time allowances
had the ability to significantly reduce the prison sentence.30 In addition, federal
prisoners were eligible for parole consideration if they received a prison sentence that
exceeded one year and had served one-third of their sentence.31 If eligible, the Parole
Commission reviewed the offender’s sentence and file, conducted an evaluation, held

24 Newton & Sidhu, supra note 4, at 1169.
25 Id. at 1170.
26 Id.
27 Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974) (“Once it is determined that a sentence is within
the limitations set forth in the statute under which it is imposed, appellate review is at an end.”).
28 See MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 6, 21–23 (1973). For a study
of the judge disparity, see ANTHONY PARTRIDGE & WILLIAM B. ELDRIDGE, THE SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING
STUDY: A REPORT TO THE JUDGES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT (1974).
29 Newton & Sidhu, supra note 4, at 1170.
30 Id. at 1170–71 (“[R]anging from reductions of up to five days per month (or 17%) for sentences less
than one year to ten days per month (or 33%) for sentences of ten years or more. . . . [P]risoners could earn
additional good time allowances—of up to five days per month or even more for ‘exceptionally meritorious
service’—by working in a prison industry or camp. As a result, for some prisoners, good time allowances
resulted in their service of less than half of the sentences imposed by the district courts.”); see 18 U.S.C. § 4161
(repealed 1984).
31 See Hoffman, supra note 8, at 6–7.
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hearings, and determined whether to release the offender earlier.32 Until the late
1970s, the parole system largely resembled the federal sentencing system. The Parole
Commission did not have uniform guidelines in its review of sentences and each
panel was afforded broad discretion in its determinations.33 Consequently, there was
no predictability, proportionality, or uniformity in the prison sentence federal
defendants actually served. Nevertheless, the American attitude—that federal
prisoners could be rehabilitated through punishment—supported and fundamentally
shaped the practice of early release on parole.34
The American attitude changed in the 1970s and 1980s due to the dramatic rise
in crime and recidivism rates, as the United States was faced with its highest crime
rate in history.35 This change in American sentiment, coupled with Congress’
beliefs––that federal sentences were “too lenient” for certain offenses or offenders
and did not “reflect the seriousness of the offense,” that judges and parole authorities
possessed large discretion in issuing a sentence, and that wide disparities in sentences
resulted among similarly situated defendants for similar crimes––sparked the
movement for sentencing reform.36 Thus, the sentencing reform proposed by Judge
Marvin E. Frankel in 197237 and the bill proposed to Congress by Senator Edward
Kennedy in 1975 began to gain the support they needed to be enacted.38 Finally,
Congress passed, and President Reagan signed, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
(“SRA”)39 after nine years of Congressional deliberation.40
Congress sought to create consistency, transparency, predictability, and fairness
in federal sentencing through this much-needed sentencing reform. Congress wanted
to establish a system that issued sentences that appropriately reflected the seriousness
of the offense and that provided the defendants with a definitive timeframe.41 The
SRA enacted six main reforms: (1) it set forth the sentencing factors and purposes of

32 Id. at 11.
33 See id. at 1, 11, 21–22.
34 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38–41 (1983) (“In the federal system today, criminal sentencing is based largely
on an outmoded rehabilitation model.”). See also Stith & Koh, supra note 5, at 227.
35 See Newton & Sidhu, supra note 4, at 1182–83 (noting that, the decade before the enactment of the
original sentencing guidelines, “between 38.0% and 51.4% of federal offenders were rearrested within three
years of their release from federal prison.”); FED. BUREAU PRISONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RESEARCH
REVIEW: RECIDIVISM AMONG FEDERAL OFFENDERS 2 (1986), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/1022224NCJRS.pdf.).
36 See Newton & Sidhu, supra note 4, at 1178, 1182.
37 Judge Frankel, a federal district judge for the Southern District of New York, advocated for sentencing
reform, and proposed a National Commission that would study sentencing and develop sentencing factors with
a grading system to provide set principles and goals for judges to use at sentencing. See Judge Frankel,
Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 41–54 (1972).
38 See generally Stith & Koh, supra note 5.
39 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987–2040 (1984).
40 In 1975, Senator Edward Kennedy introduced legislation to establish a Sentencing Commission, but it
was not until nine years later that the bill had passed both houses by an overwhelming majority. In 1984,
President Ronald Reagan signed the SRA. For more information regarding the legislative history, see Stith &
Koh, supra note 5.
41 Congress believed that current sentences were too lenient and did not reflect the seriousness of the
offense or the history of the defendant, and found that “prisoners often did not really know how long they
[would] spend in prison until the very day they [were] released.” S. REP. No. 98-225, at 49, 56–59, 75 (1983).

264

Journal of Legislation

[Vol. 44:2]

sentencing,42 (2) established the Sentencing Commission,43 (3) created the
Sentencing Guidelines,44 (4) required judges to provide an explanation for the
sentences imposed,45 (5) permitted appellate review,46 and (6) abolished parole
consideration by the United States Parole Commission.47 In doing so, Congress
hoped to shift the federal sentencing structure from a system of “indeterminate
sentencing” to a system of “determinate sentencing” that curtailed judge discretion.48
This Section will highlight two of these reforms: first, the sentencing factors and
purposes, and second, the sentencing guidelines.
A.

Sentencing Factors and Purposes

The SRA set forth the sentencing factors and the purposes of sentencing to be
considered by the sentencing judges. Specifically, the SRA advanced seven factors
that judges must consider before imposing a sentence, which include: (1) “the nature
and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant,”49 (2) the need for the sentence imposed to achieve the purposes of
sentencing,50 (3) “the kinds of sentences available,”51 (4) the applicable guideline
range,52 (5) any pertinent policies,53 (6) “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence
disparities . . . ,”54 and (7) the need to provide restitution to the victims.55 The
purposes of sentencing are retribution,56 deterrence,57 incapacitation,58 and

42 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
43 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2012).
44 Id. § 994.
45 Judges must state an explanation for the sentence imposed, which includes any reasons for departure
or variance from the Guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2012).
46 All sentences are subject to appellate review, id. § 3742, to ensure that the Sentencing Guidelines were
correctly applied, which in turn, assures that the sentences are reasonable and supported, remain proportional
and fair, do not lead to any disparities between similarly situated defendants, and “are sufficient, but not greater
than necessary to achieve the purposes of sentencing.” Id. § 3553 (2012). This transformed the system from
being virtually unreviewable to a system that is subject to appeal.
47 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987–2040 (1984); see Hoffman,
supra note 8, at 2. However, the SRA continued to allow for good time allowances to incentivize federal
prisoners to engage in good behavior but restricted good time allowances to only those prisoners who received
a sentence of more than one year, and the credit was capped at 15% of a federal prisoner’s sentence. See 18
U.S.C. § 3624(b) (2008).
48 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 15, at § 1A1.1–1.2.
49 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2012).
50 Id. § 3553(a)(2).
51 Id. § 3553(a)(3).
52 Id. § 3553(a)(4).
53 Id. § 3553(a)(5).
54 Id. § 3553(a)(6).
55 Id. § 3553(a)(7).
56 The sentence imposed needs to impart retribution for the offense by “reflect[ing] the seriousness of the
offense, . . . promot[ing] respect for the law, and . . . provid[ing] just punishment for the offense.” Id. §
3553(a)(2)(A).
57 The sentence imposed needs “to afford adequate deterrence” to both the offender and the public. Id.
§ 3553(a)(2)(B).
58 The sentence imposed needs to incapacitate “to protect the public from further crimes.” Id.
§ 3553(a)(2)(C) (2010).
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rehabilitation.59 The judge must conduct an open evaluation of these factors and
consider all other pertinent information and policies not covered in the SRA or the
accompanying Guidelines before reaching a sentencing decision. Overall, the SRA
requires that the sentence imposed be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to
meet those purposes.60
B.

Sentencing Guidelines

The Sentencing Commission was tasked with establishing federal sentencing
guidelines.61 Congress intended for the Guidelines to “eliminat[e] unwarranted
disparity; [provide] transparency, certainty, and fairness; [afford] proportionate
punishment; and [initiate] crime control through deterrence, incapacitation, and the
rehabilitation of [defendants].”62 The Guidelines were to achieve this by taking into
account the characteristics of the offense and the relevant defendant.63 As such, the
Commission would be able to ensure that both discrimination and irrelevant
differences among defendants did not affect sentence determinations.64 Furthermore,
parties would be in a better position to predict sentences based on an evaluation of
the facts of the case.65
With those goals in mind, the Sentencing Commission developed the Guidelines
by conducting studies of past sentencing practices.66 The Commission evaluated data
on over 100,000 federal sentencing cases.67 The Commission further examined the
corresponding presentence reports, files, and data from the Bureau of Prisons and the
United States Parole Commission for 10,500 of those 100,000 cases to determine, or
estimate, the actual amount of time served by those defendants.68 The average prison
sentence for each type of crime was calculated and served as a benchmark for the
“base offense level” of each generic crime category.69 Using a multiple regression
computer analysis, the Commission identified and analyzed aggravating and
mitigating factors for each type of crime that created sentence gradations.70 These
factors provided the basis for each type of crime’s “specific offense characteristics,”
which increased or decreased the “base offense level.”71 Using this data, the
Commission then drafted guidelines, received public feedback, and based succeeding

59 The sentence imposed needs to rehabilitate by “provid[ing] the defendant with needed . . . correctional
treatment.” Id. § 3553(a)(2)(D).
60 Id. § 3553(a)(1).
61 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1) (2012).
62 Fifteen Years of Guidelines Sentencing, supra note 7, at 269. For an overview of the development of
the Sentencing Guidelines, see id.
63 Id. at 270. Newton & Sidhu, supra note 4, at 1186.
64 Fifteen Years of Guidelines Sentencing, supra note 7, at 275.
65 Id. at 276.
66 Id. at 269.
67 Id.; Newton & Sidhu, supra note 4, at 1197.
68 Newton & Sidhu, supra note 4, at 1197–99.
69 See Fifteen Years of Guidelines Sentencing, supra note 7, at 269.
70 See Newton & Sidhu, supra note 4, at 1198.
71 See Fifteen Years of Guidelines Sentencing, supra note 7, at 269–70.
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drafts on that feedback.72 The end result was a seven-chapter manual. The manual
was made with the understanding that it would be amended and would evolve to
reflect the sentencing needs at the current time.73
Today, the Sentencing Guidelines is an eight-chapter manual with three
appendices and one index. Chapter One provides the Guideline’s general application
principles; specifically, the rules on relevant conduct and on the information that can
be considered.74 Chapter Two presents the guidelines for each type of “Offense
Conduct.”75 There are approximately 155 types of federal offenses. A standard
guideline in this Chapter has both a “base offense level”—the offense in its
foundational form––and “specific offense characteristics”––aggravating and
mitigating factors for that particular offense type. For example, the offense of
Kidnapping, Abduction or Unlawful Restraint has a base offense level of thirty-two,
while there are various specific offense characteristics that raise or lower that offense
level, including, among others, ransom demand, bodily injury, sexual exploitation,
and use of a dangerous weapon.76 Chapter Three contains “Adjustments” that relate
to general aggravating or mitigating factors common across all federal offense
types.77 There are approximately twenty adjustments relating to obstruction, multiple
counts, acceptance of responsibility, the defendant’s role in the offense, and victimrelated adjustments. For instance, some adjustments include hate crime motivation,78
commission of offense while on release,79 and acceptance of responsibility.80 This
Note discusses the adjustment for the defendant’s aggravating role.81
Chapter Four pertains to the defendant’s criminal history and criminal
livelihood.82 This Chapter contains the rules for computing a defendant’s criminal
history points, which determine his or her criminal history category on the Sentencing
Table. Chapter Five includes the rules for determining each aspect of a defendant’s
sentence and the Sentencing Table.83 This Chapter provides the rules for imposing
probation, imprisonment, supervised release, restitution, fines, assessments,
forfeitures, and other sentencing options. It also includes various policy statements
for departures relating to the specific offense characteristics,84 such as age,85 mental
and emotional conditions,86 and addictions.87 Chapter Six provides provisions
regarding the sentencing procedure and policy statements on acceptance or rejection
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87

Newton & Sidhu, supra note 4, at 1199. For an overview of the history of the drafts, see id.
GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 15, at § 1A1.2.
Id. at § 1B.
Id. at § 2.
Id. at § 2A4.1.
Id. at § 3.
Id. at § 3A1.1.
Id. at § 3C1.3.
Id. at § 3E1.1.
Id. at § 3B1.1.
Id. at § 4.
Id. at § 5.
Id. at § 5H.
Id. at § 5H1.1.
Id. at § 5H1.3.
Id. at § 5H1.4.
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of plea agreements.88 Chapter Seven includes policy statements for violations of
probation and supervised release.89 Chapter Eight provides guidelines on sentencing
an organization.90
1.

Procedure

As mentioned, the Guidelines set out a strict procedure that judges are to follow
to calculate the applicable sentencing range.91 First, the judge determines which
Chapter Two offense guideline applies to the case at issue by consulting Appendix A
of the Sentencing Guidelines Manual. Second, using that applicable Chapter Two
offense guideline, the judge finds the “base offense level” and calculates any
modifications92 in that offense level for any “specific offense characteristics” based
upon the relevant conduct provisions included in that guideline. Third, the judge
determines if any additional Chapter Three “adjustments” provisions are warranted
and adjusts the offense level accordingly. Fourth, the judge, using the Chapter Four
provisions, calculates the defendant’s “criminal history points” and places the
defendant in a criminal history category. Fifth, the judge identifies the sentencing
guideline range in the Chapter Five Sentencing Table by locating the cell in the table
where the defendant’s offense level and criminal history category intersect. Lastly,
the judge contemplates all possible grounds for a “departure” or “variance” from the
applicable guideline range by consulting the § 3553(a) factors93 set out in the SRA
and policy statements located in Chapter Five. After the judge has adequately gone
through this procedure and considered all factors, a sentence is imposed that is
sufficient but not greater than necessary.
Despite the seemingly straightforward Guidelines procedure, ambiguity still
remains regarding the applicability of the Chapter Two “specific offense
characteristics” and the Chapter Three “adjustments,” which leads to inconsistent
application in practice. As a result, the Guidelines Manual appears to not be as
effective as it could be in achieving its goals of uniformity, proportionality, and
predictability.
III. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1: ADJUSTMENT FOR AGGRAVATING ROLE
As mentioned in the preceding section, the third step of the Guidelines
application procedure is to determine whether any Chapter Three “Adjustments”
apply. The adjustment this Note will discuss is the sentencing enhancement for the
defendant’s aggravating role in “otherwise extensive” criminal activity. The
Sentencing Commission did not define what constitutes “extensiveness” under this
provision. In this section, I will examine the provision and the accompanying
comments, its purpose within the Sentencing Guidelines, and the provision’s context
88
89
90
91
92
93

Id. at § 6.
Id. at § 7.
Id. at § 8.
See generally U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 13, at 15–16.
Any increases and/or decreases in that offense level. Id. at 15.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
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within the structure of the Guidelines to provide some direction as to its proper
application.
A.

Provision and Commentary

The United States Sentencing Guideline § 3B1.1 (a) and (b) for an aggravating
role states, in relevant part:
§ 3B1.1: Aggravating Role94
Based on the defendant’s role in the offense, increase the offense level as
follows:
(a) If the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that
involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive,
increase by 4 levels.
(b) If the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or
leader) and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or
was otherwise extensive, increase by 3 levels.

It is clear from both of these provisions that the court must make two
determinations. First, a role determination in reference to whether the defendant
served as a leader, organizer, manager, or supervisor. Secondly, a scope
determination in regards to whether the criminal activity meets either the amount of
participants requirement or, alternatively, the extensiveness threshold.95 However,
the provision remains ambiguous in regards to what constitutes “otherwise extensive”
criminal activity.
The commentary makes several clarifications that are important in the
“extensiveness” determination, but it does not resolve it completely. First, a
participant is defined as “a person who is criminally responsible for the commission
of the offense, but need not have been convicted.”96 Second, this sentencing
enhancement only applies to a defendant who was “the organizer, leader, manager or
supervisor of one or more other participants.”97 Lastly, “all persons involved during
the course of the entire offense are to be considered” when determining
“extensiveness.”98 Thus, an organization that involves less than five participants can
be considered extensive if it involved the “unknowing services” of others.99

94 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 15, at § 3B1.1(a), (b). Part (c) was omitted, as it pertains to criminal
activity that is not otherwise extensive.
95 See generally 21 AM. JUR. 2D, Criminal Law § 771 (2018).
96 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 15, at § 3B1.1 cmt. n. 1.
97 Id. at cmt. n. 2.
98 Id. at cmt. n. 3; see also Van Arsdale, supra note 23.
99 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 15, at § 3B1.1 cmt. n. 3.
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Despite the language of the provision and its commentary, ambiguity regarding
the proper method to determine “extensiveness” remains, which is illustrated in the
current split that divides the circuits. Is the “otherwise extensive criminal activity”
limited to activity that amounts to the equivalent of five participants? Or is it a totality
of the circumstances analysis that considers all relevant factors regarding the scope
of the criminal activity? Or does it encompass something else? This Note seeks to
answer these lingering questions.
B.

Purpose of the Adjustment

Courts look to the policy of the Sentencing Commission when interpreting an
ambiguous provision of the Sentencing Guidelines.100 Under the SRA, Congress
sought to achieve uniformity and proportionality by requiring judges to calculate the
applicable guidelines range based on factors determined by the Sentencing
Commission to be pertinent and to then impose a sentence from within that narrow
range.101 Although the Guidelines are no longer mandatory after Booker, the policy
persists, as judges must use the Guidelines as a starting point.
The primary concern behind the Sentencing Commission’s inclusion of the
aggravating role adjustment is the “defendant’s relative responsibility [in] the
commission of the offense.”102 The Commission intended for the adjustment to apply
when both the scope of the organization and the degree of the defendant’s
responsibility increased.103 In other words, the provision sought to ensure that
defendants’ sentences are proportional to their level of responsibility. For example,
in a money laundering case, a defendant who was an organizer of a three-participant
conspiracy should not receive the same “offense level” as the leader of the
prostitution organization that involved four participants and the unwitting services of
twenty others. As illustrated, the Commission wanted to impose essentially the same
sentence on similar defendants who committed similar crimes, while at the same time
also distinguish non-similar defendants in order to eliminate unwarranted disparities
and to achieve greater uniformity among sentences.104 This aggravating role
adjustment addressed that distinction, and thus, is appropriate when the defendant
has authority or control over an organization that either involves five or more
participants or is otherwise extensive.105
C. Context Within the Sentencing Guidelines
The Guidelines are structured into an easy-to-follow process such that a judge
proceeds chronologically from Chapter Two through Chapter Five to arrive at the
applicable sentence range unless the circumstances make Chapter Six, Seven, or
100 See generally 21 AM. JUR. 2D, Criminal Law § 756 (2018).
101 See generally id. § 748.
102 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 15, at § 3B1.1 cmt. background; see also 21 AM. JUR. 2D, Criminal
Law § 771 (2018).
103 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 15, at § 3B1.1 cmt. background.
104 See generally Blum, supra note 11.
105 Id.; see also 21 AM. JUR. 2D, Criminal Law § 771 (2018).
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Eight relevant. The aggravating role guideline is located in Chapter Three.
Therefore, prior to considering the aggravating role enhancement, a judge has already
performed the Chapter Two analysis. Specifically, the judge would have determined
the applicable Chapter Two offense and located its “base offense level.” The judge
would have also considered all relevant conduct pertaining to the “specific offense
characteristics”––all aggravating or mitigating circumstances that are specific to the
particular offense at issue––and applied any necessary departures from the “base
offense level.” Chapter Three, on the other hand, contains general aggravating or
mitigating circumstances––factors that apply generally and are not specific to the
offense at hand––that were not taken into account in other guidelines, including
Chapter Two’s specific offense characteristics.106 The relevant conduct to be
considered under a Chapter Three adjustment is strictly limited to the language of the
adjustment provisions and is not to double count the same aspects of the same
conduct that was factored into the sentencing calculation in a previous step or
chapter.107
IV. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR “OTHERWISE EXTENSIVE” CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
SCOPE DETERMINATION
Due to the ambiguous meaning of “extensiveness,” there is a current circuit split.
It is uncontested that to qualify for the adjustment under the scope determination, the
defendant must have led, organized, supervised, or managed at least one other
participant—someone “who is criminally responsible for the commission of the
offense, but need not have been convicted.”108 In addition, the circuits agree that the
enhancement is appropriate under the “extensiveness” prong when the criminal
activity involves the equivalent of five participants. However, the circuits disagree
about whether the test to determine equivalence “must focus upon a headcount of the
individuals involved, or may also rely upon other indices of extensiveness such as
the magnitude of the harm, the complexity of the planning, or the number of
victims.”109 This Section will discuss these two leading approaches that the circuits
have taken.

106 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 15, at § 1B1.3 cmt. n. 2 (“In certain cases, a defendant may be
accountable for particular conduct under more than one subsection of this guideline. If a defendant’s
accountability for particular conduct is established under one provision of this guideline, it is not necessary to
review alternative provisions under which such accountability might be established.”). For a general overview
of the structure of the application of the Guidelines, see GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 15, at § 1B.
107 See, e.g., United States v. Diekemper, 604 F.3d 345, 354 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Double-counting under the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual occurs . . . if precisely the same aspect of a defendant’s conduct factors into
his sentence in two separate ways.”)
108 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 15, at § 3B1.1 cmt. n. 2; see also United States v. Skys, 637 F.3d
146, 156 (2d Cir. 2011).
109 United States v. Helbling, 209 F.3d 226, 244 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1100 (2001).
Compare United States v. Carrozzella, 105 F.3d 796, 802–03 (2d Cir. 1997) (focusing analysis on the number
of individuals involved), with United States v. Dietz, 950 F.2d 50, 53–54 (1st Cir. 1991) (permitting
consideration of a broad range of factors).
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Numerosity Approach

The Second, Third, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits have adopted a numerosity approach
to determine “extensiveness,” which requires a showing that the criminal activity
involved the functional equivalent of five or more participants.110 The courts in these
circuits conduct a three-fact inquiry by considering: (1) “the number of knowing
participants,” (2) “the number of unknowing participants whose activities were
organized, led, [managed, or supervised] by the defendant with specific criminal
intent,” and (3) “the extent to which the services of the unknowing participants were
peculiar and necessary to the criminal scheme.”111 Under the first factor, the court is
more likely to find the criminal activity to be extensive as the number of knowing
participants increases.112 Under the second factor, the court separates out
nonparticipants who facilitate the defendant’s criminal activities but who are not the
functional equivalents of participants.113 This factor requires that the defendant has
specific criminal intent in involving them in the offense and considers the nature of
the nonparticipants’ role in the offense.114 Thus, the analysis of “otherwise
extensive” under the numerosity approach focuses at first upon the number of
participants and unknowing nonparticipants involved in the criminal activity,
followed by a subsequent determination regarding whether their roles and
involvement amounts to the functional equivalent of five participants.115
These circuits implement this numerosity approach for a variety of reasons.
First, the circuits believe that focusing the inquiry upon the number and roles of the
individuals involved, both knowing participants and unknowing nonparticipants,
corresponds with the language of the provision.116 The text of the provision and its
accompanying commentary are concerned with the number of people involved in the
criminal activity and the size of the organization.117 It does not make reference to
the other factors that are considered under the totality of the circumstances
approach.118 Moreover, the numerosity approach best complies with the structure of
the Sentencing Guidelines because the adjustment is meant to account for factors that
have not already been considered in prior guidelines.119 Therefore, the numerosity
approach reduces the “potential for double counting certain aspects of [the] criminal
activity that are already considered elsewhere in the [G]uidelines” and that have

110 Carrozzella, 105 F.3d at 803; Helbling, 209 F.3d at 247–48; United States v. Anthony, 280 F.3d 694,
701 (6th Cir. 2002).
111 Carrozzella, 105 F.3d at 803–04; see, e.g., United States v. Kent, 821 F.3d 362, 369 (2d Cir. 2016);
United States v. Bathily, 392 F. App’x 371, 377–78 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 269
(3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 821 (2002); Anthony, 280 F.3d at 700; United States v. Wilson, 240 F.3d
39, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Helbling, 209 F.3d at 247–48.
112 Carrozzella, 105 F.3d at 804; United States v. Archer, 671 F.3d 149, 165 (2d Cir. 2011).
113 Carrozzella, 105 F.3d at 804.
114 Id.; Helbling, 209 F.3d at 247–48.
115 United States v. Helbling, 209 F.3d 226, 244 (3d Cir. 2000).
116 Id. at 245.
117 United States v. Anthony, 280 F.3d 694, 699 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Wilson, 240 F.3d 39, 48
(D.C. Cir. 2001).
118 Anthony, 280 F.3d at 700.
119 See Helbling, 209 F.3d at 245.
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already resulted in a sentencing enhancement.120 Third, the purpose of the sentencing
adjustment was to have sentences reflect the criminal culpability or role of the
defendant.121 These circuits propose that if the Sentencing Commission intended for
the provision to call for a broader interpretation of “extensiveness” it could explicitly
say so, whereas the notes clearly indicate the policy advanced through this provision
is to have sentences account for the relative responsibility of the defendant compared
to other defendants.122 This test enables a court to “identify an individual whose
contribution [is] so essential to the criminal objective that he should be counted as a
‘participant.’”123
1.

Application of Test

In their application of the numerosity approach, these circuits have found the
criminal activity to be “otherwise extensive” in cases where there was at least one
participant but involved the necessary services of unknowing outsiders. For example,
the Second Circuit in Archer124 affirmed the application of the aggravating role
adjustment for being a leader of otherwise extensive criminal activity.125 The court
determined that the visa fraud and the conspiracy to commit visa fraud were extensive
because: (1) there were at least three participants, (2) there were a fair number of
unknowing nonparticipants––the defendant’s clients––who signed the applications
and the defendant led these clients with the specific criminal intent of filing false visa
applications, and (3) the services of the unknowing nonparticipants were peculiar and
necessary to the defendant’s criminal scheme––the defendant needed them to provide
their own information and to secure the supporting affidavits that the office prepared
in order to commit the visa fraud.126 Likewise, the Third Circuit in Helbling127 found
that the district court properly applied the aggravating role enhancement because the
defendant was a leader of an embezzlement fund scheme that was otherwise
extensive.128 The scheme involved three criminally responsible participants and five
unknowing nonparticipants. The defendant directed the nonparticipants’ actions and
their actions were peculiar and necessary since they helped hide his criminal activity,
transformed the accounts into the type needed to embezzle funds, and aided his

120 Id. at 246; see also United States v. Carrozzella, 105 F.3d 796, 802–03 (2d Cir. 1997).
121 Helbling, 209 F.3d at 245.
122 Helbling, 209 F.3d at 246; see also Anthony, 280 F.3d at 700.
123 United States v. Anthony, 280 F.3d 694, 70001 (6th Cir. 2002).
124 United States v. Archer, 671 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2011).
125 Id. at 165.
126 Id. at 166; see also United States v. Rubenstein, 403 F.3d 93, 99 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding the
extensiveness requirement met when there were at least two knowing participants and as many as seven
unknowing nonparticipants who were necessary to the criminal activity).
127 United States v. Helbling, 209 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2000).
128 Id. at 250.
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embezzlements.129 Similarly, in Embry,130 the Sixth Circuit held that the defendant’s
false tax return scheme was extensive because it involved one participant and nearly
150 unknowing participants—taxpayers—who were necessary in signing the false
tax returns.131
However, these circuits have also remanded cases or found the enhancement to
be improperly applied when the district court made inadequate factual findings to
support the three-prong test or when the district court considered factors that were
already contemplated in calculating the offense level. For instance, in Skys,132 the
Second Circuit determined that the district court’s factual findings that the defendant
led a life of fraud and was constantly seeking new victims were insufficient to support
the extensiveness prong of the aggravating role enhancement, and could possibly
indicate an impermissible overlap with the number-of-victims enhancement already
applied.133 Similarly, the D.C. Circuit in Wilson134 found that the aggravating role
enhancement for being a leader or organizer for otherwise extensive activity was
improperly applied, as there was no evidence that the defendant organized or led the
unknowing nonparticipants—numerous bank personnel—since they were following
their routine practice even though their services were peculiar and necessary to the
scheme and the defendant used them with specific criminal intent.135
B.

Totality of the Circumstances Approach

The First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits
implemented a totality of the circumstances approach to determine what constitutes
“otherwise extensive” criminal activity. This broader inquiry does not limit the
extensiveness inquiry to solely a function of the number of criminally culpable
participants or unknowing nonparticipants engaged in the activity. Instead, these
circuits examine the “totality of the circumstances,” which includes the number of
participants and nonparticipants involved as well as the “width, breadth, scope,

129 Id. at 249. For additional examples of this idea, see United States v. Britton, 567 F. App’x 158, 161
(3d Cir. 2014) (determining that the prostitution ring the defendant led was extensive because there was one
participant and the unknowing services of his many prostitutes who were necessary and particular to the criminal
activity); United States v. Bennett, 161 F.3d 171, 193–94 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 819 (1999)
(determining that the large and complex Ponzi scheme the defendant ran was extensive because it involved two
participants and at least thirteen nonparticipants who assisted the defendant by withholding information from
investors and legitimizing his activities by preparing reports based on false information).
130 United States v. Embry, 61 F. App’x 166 (6th Cir. 2003).
131 Id. at 168. For an additional example, see United States v. Zazueta-Garcia, 239 F. App’x 941, 946 (6th
Cir. 2007) (finding the criminal activity to be otherwise extensive because it involved at least seven individuals
with at least one being a knowing participant).
132 United States v. Skys, 637 F.3d 146 (2d Cir. 2011).
133 Id. at 158; see also United States v. Kent, 821 F.3d 362, 370–71 (2d Cir. 2016) (remanding the case
because the district court failed to state any factual findings regarding the number of unknowing participants
organized or led by the defendant and whether their services were peculiar and necessary to the scheme, and
instead, considered impermissible factors outside the scope of the “numerosity” test and factors that have
already been taken into account in calculating the defendant’s offense level).
134 United States v. Wilson, 240 F.3d 39 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
135 Id. at 50.

274

Journal of Legislation

[Vol. 44:2]

complexity, and duration” of the criminal activity.136 Thus, the extensiveness prong
is satisfied if the number of criminally responsible participants, the number of
unknowing outsiders, and the circumstances surrounding the criminal activity
amount to the functional equivalent of five participants.137
These circuits adopted this approach for multiple reasons. First, the circuits
believe that this approach best comports with the language of the aggravating role
adjustment because there is nothing in the text of the provision or its commentary
that limits the inquiry to a strict headcount.138 Second, to limit the inquiry to merely
a headcount of the individuals involved would effectively nullify the “otherwise
extensive” clause of the provision, which provides another alternative than just the
number of people involved.139 Lastly, the approach best incorporates the relevant
conduct provision in Chapter One of the Sentencing Guidelines that states that “all
relevant conduct surrounding the crime of conviction” can be considered.140
1.

Application of Test

These circuits have found “extensiveness” when the criminal activity involved
many participants or nonparticipants, spanned over a long duration, involved a
significant amount of victims and/or clients, involved multiple states or spanned
across a wide geographic reach, involved a large quantity of money and/or drugs, or
was a complex scheme. For example, in Pierre,141 the First Circuit found that the
cocaine conspiracy the defendant led was otherwise extensive based on the number
of people involved, the number of places in which drugs were sold, the fact drugs
were sold at both the wholesale level and retail level, the significant amount of drugs
that were sold, and the length—the activity occurred over at least three years.142
136 United States v. Dietz, 950 F.2d 50, 53 (1st Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Arbour, 559 F.3d 50,
54 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Beverly, 284 F. App’x 36, 41–42 (4th Cir. 2008). Specifically, the Ninth
Circuit looks to factors such as the “number of knowing participants and unwitting outsiders; the number of
victims; and the amount of money fraudulently or illegally obtained.” United States v. Booth, 309 F.3d 566,
577 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Rose, 20 F.3d 367, 374 (9th Cir. 1994)).
137 See United States v. Tai, 41 F.3d 1170, 1174–75 (7th Cir. 1994).
138 Arbour, 559 F.3d at 54; see also United States v. Laboy, 351 F.3d 578, 586 (1st Cir. 2003).
139 The pertinent clause of the aggravating role guideline provision reads: “that involved five or more
participants or was otherwise extensive . . . .” GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 15, at § 3B1.1(a)–(b)
(emphasis added); see Laboy, 351 F.3d at 585 n.10; Dietz, 950 F.2d at 53; United States v. Tejada-Beltran, 50
F.3d 105, 113 (1st Cir. 1995); Arbour, 559 F.3d at 53.
140 United States v. Holland, 22 F.3d 1040, 1045 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1109 (1995); see
also Arbour, 559 F.3d at 54; Laboy, 351 F.3d at 585.
141 United States v. Pierre, 484 F.3d 75 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 915 (2007).
142 Pierre, 484 F.3d at 89; see also United States v. Al Kabouni, 641 F. App’x 6, 8 (1st Cir. 2016)
(determining the criminal activity to be extensive when it involved numerous unwitting store employees and
beneficiaries, and the illicit transfer of $1.9 million in SNAP credits over roughly three years); United States v.
Arbour, 559 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2009) (determining the criminal activity was extensive because it involved a
host of knowing and unknowing participants for a significant duration of time, and involved overarching drug
and firearm dealings); United States v. Colón-Muñoz, 318 F.3d 348, 364 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that the
extensiveness prong was met since the fraud was complex, and involved many unwitting participants, more
than minimal planning, a series of documents prepared internally through a bank and externally through a
notary, and a number of checks personally issued by the defendant); United States v. Anderson, 139 F.3d 291,
297 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 866 (1998) (determining that the prostitution ring was extensive because
a significant number of women were under the defendant’s control, the services of several other individuals
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Likewise, in Fluker,143 the Seventh Circuit found the fraudulent criminal activity to
be extensive because there were three participants, over $18 million was obtained,
the geographic scope involved at least six states, it affected over 3,000 people, and
was deemed complex in its use of straw buyers to facilitate housing program
transactions.144 Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit found the extensiveness criteria
were used in pursuit of his activities, and his plan involved prostitution in three states); United States v.
D’Andrea, 107 F.3d 949, 957 (1st Cir. 1997) (determining the bank fraud was extensive because it involved
fraud against two financial institutions, the submission of many documents that contained false financial
information and forged signatures to obtain loans for $8.1 million, the manipulation of figures to misrepresent
that he was investing his money into the sale, conspiracy with another participant to falsify the actual sale price
of the property, and the use of unwitting services of many others to secure the loans); United States v. Rostoff,
53 F.3d 398, 414 (1st Cir. 1995) (determining the fraud conspiracy was otherwise extensive since it lasted for
over three years, involved at least 140 fraudulent loans, consumed millions of dollars, affected many lives, and
involved a legion of people beyond the five named defendants); Tejada-Beltran, 50 F.3d at 113 (finding that a
scheme to smuggle illegal immigrants met the extensiveness requirement because of its duration, the number
of clients involved, and its geographic reach); United States v. Graciani, 61 F.3d 70, 76 n.7 (1st Cir. 1995)
(finding the extensiveness requirement met by a ledger that established a wide-ranging pattern of drug
trafficking activities, and a trash bag containing thousands of empty vials used to package crack cocaine); Dietz,
950 F.2d at 54 (finding the criminal activity of committing fraud against the Social Security Administration was
extensive because it occurred for over twelve years, used many false identities, and involved seven states, eight
government agencies, and more than five persons to complete the scheme).
For a Fourth Circuit application, see United States v. Beverly, 284 F. App’x 36, 42 (4th Cir. 2008) (finding
the defendant’s scheme to defraud the Medicaid system to be extensive since it involved numerous employees
and clients, derived excessive revenue in the amount of $2.6 million, occurred over multiple locations, and was
a large operation).
143 United States v. Fluker, 698 F.3d 988 (7th Cir. 2012).
144 Id. at 1002–03; see also United States v. Hussein, 664 F.3d 155, 162 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding
extensiveness because the defendant made a substantial portion of his income from the food stamp scheme,
amounting to almost $2 million through fraudulent redemptions, the operation continued for an extended period
of time, the defendant traded cash for benefits with hundreds of customers, he used many food stamp venders
to make a profit, and he ran the scam from multiple locations); United States v. Pabey, 664 F.3d 1084, 1097
(7th Cir. 2011) (extensiveness found when the criminal activity involved two participants and at least five lowerlevel workers); United States v. Diekemper, 604 F.3d 345, 354 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding the bankruptcy and mail
fraud conspiracy to be extensive when the scheme involved three knowing participants and six outsiders,
spanned over four years, involved more than $2.5 million, was highly orchestrated, and utilized the assistance
of several other people); United States v. Chen, 497 F.3d 718, 722 (7th Cir. 2007) (criminal activity was
otherwise extensive because it involved roughly $380,000, about 150 victims, a significant number of
participants and nonparticipants, a record keeping system of the daily activity, and used means of extortion to
receive debt collection); United States v. Shearer, 479 F.3d 478, 483 (7th Cir. 2007) (extensiveness found
because the criminal activity involved two participants and more than four outsiders); United States v. Mansoori,
304 F.3d 635, 668 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 967 (2003) (criminal activity was extensive, as it
involved at least five individuals, had a broad temporal and geographic reach, and involved numerous narcotics
transactions that took place on a daily basis); United States v. Frost, 281 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2002) (criminal
activity was otherwise extensive since a substantial portion of the defendant’s income was obtained by fraud
and the amount of the loss was about $2.8 million); United States v. Miller, 962 F.2d 739, 745 (7th Cir. 1992)
(extensiveness found when the criminal activity involved two participants and four outsiders); United States v.
McKenzie, 922 F.2d 1323, 1329 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 854 (1991) (extensiveness found when it
involved at least seven individuals, several couriers, cross-country trips, and numerous drugs for money
transactions).
For some examples of the Fifth Circuit’s precedent, see United States v. Akinosho, 285 F. App’x 128, 130
(5th Cir. 2008) (finding the criminal activity was otherwise extensive and there was at least one participant);
United States v. Fullwood, 342 F.3d 409, 415 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1111 (2004) (criminal
activity was otherwise extensive because it involved three participants and the unwitting services of at least
eleven other agencies); United States v. Sidhu, 130 F.3d 644, 655 (5th Cir. 1997) (court found the criminal
activity was otherwise extensive when the defendant submitted false claims for medical services, the defendant
recruited numerous office employees to provide billing and collection support for his fraudulent practices, the
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met when the fraud lasted for over ten years, resulted in the loss of over $20 million,
and involved one participant with the unknowing services of many others to
perpetrate the fraud.145
However, these circuits have found the “extensiveness” prong to not be satisfied
when the operation was small, occurred over a short duration, and involved a lesser
quantity of drugs and/or money. For instance, the Fourth Circuit in Lines146 found
scheme generated more than $2 million in fraudulent billings over a nineteen month period, and when the fraud
could not have succeeded without unwitting participation of his vulnerable patients and unknowing assistance
of employees); United States v. Mergerson, 4 F.3d 337, 348 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1198 (1994)
(the defendant’s drug trafficking operation was extensive because it involved four participants and the defendant
controlled the unwitting services of several girls who distributed heroin for him, involved an extremely large
quantity of heroin, and was high-purity heroin); United States v. Stouffer, 986 F.2d 916, 927 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 837 (1993) (finding that activity involving over 2,000 investors and $11 million in fraudulently
obtained funds was “otherwise extensive”); United States v. Allibhai, 939 F.2d 244, 25253 (5th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1072 (1992) (extensiveness found for money laundering scheme that involved $1 million,
four participants, and the unknowing service of many outsiders).
145 United States v. Zada, 706 F. App’x 500, 509 (11th Cir. 2017); see also United States v. Sosa, 777
F.3d 1279, 1301–02 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that a Medicaid fraud scheme was otherwise extensive where the
defendant recruited at least a dozen patients, falsified medical records, submitted more than $1 million in false
claims in just three months, and received almost $119,000); United States v. Rodriguez, 981 F.2d 1199, 1200
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 955 (1993) (concluding that criminal activity was otherwise extensive based
on its extensive geographic scope and amount of cocaine involved).
For an example of the Tenth Circuit’s application, see United States v. Yarnell, 129 F.3d 1127, 1139 (10th
Cir. 1997) (extensiveness found when the fraudulent enterprise covered a wide geographic region, involved at
least forty victims, generated losses in excess of $140,000, included one participant and the unwitting services
of others, and involved considerable planning and complex execution).
For some examples of the Ninth Circuit’s precedent, see United States v. Farris, 585 F. App’x 934, 936 (9th
Cir. 2014) (finding extensiveness because the defendant perpetrated an elaborate fraud involving millions of
dollars, many employees, and victims across several states); United States v. Wynn, 300 F. App’x 544, 546 (9th
Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1216 (2009) (finding criminal activity to be otherwise extensive since it
involved a significant loss of money and a substantial number of fraudulent tax returns); United States v. Cooley,
68 F. App’x 804, 806 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 992 (2003) (finding extensiveness when the fraudulent
enterprise involved the services of many individuals and twenty victims, the amount of money obtained
exceeded $1 million, involved numerous transactions and corporations, and the activity spanned more than five
years); United States v. Booth, 309 F.3d 566, 577 (9th Cir. 2002) (extensiveness found for a fraudulent scheme
involving more than ten unknowing employees and spanning across a wide geographical reach); United States
v. Govan, 152 F.3d 1088, 1096 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that a conspiracy was otherwise extensive because it
involved interstate travel, a large number of victims, and nearly $100,000 in robbery proceeds); United States
v. Rose, 20 F.3d 367, 374 (9th Cir. 1994) (criminal activity was extensive because the fraudulent scheme
involved about $3 million, sixty knowing or unwitting participants, and many victims).
For Eighth Circuit precedent, see United States v. Lizarraga, 682 F. App’x 529, 533 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
138 S. Ct. 277 (2017) (finding the criminal activity otherwise extensive due to the nature and complexity of the
operation and its geographical reach, as the defendant and those under his control traveled between California
and Iowa to retrieve or deliver large quantities of drugs and the proceeds of the drug sales were to be wired in
U.S. and Mexican bank accounts opened in other peoples’ names); United States v. Branch, 591 F.3d 602, 612
(8th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1115 (2010) (extensiveness criteria met when the scheme involved
hundreds of victims, several business locations, and the unwitting services of more than 20 people); United
States v. Rosas, 486 F.3d 374, 377 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding extensiveness when there was a separate apartment
to operate a drug storehouse and involved materials to prevent the detection of the illegal narcotics, five crosscountry trips to pick up drugs, and a significant amount of high purity methamphetamine); United States v.
Senty-Haugen, 449 F.3d 862, 864 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding the tax scheme to be extensive where twenty-nine
fraudulent income tax returns were filed resulting in approximately $71,000 of loss); United States v. Brockman,
183 F.3d 891, 900 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1080 (2000) (finding the fraudulent criminal activity
to be extensive because there were four participants, it involved $5.8 million, it was a thirteen year scheme, and
it involved a number of unwitting outsiders).
146 United States v. Lines, No. 99-4440, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 18330 (4th Cir. 2000).
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that the criminal activity was not extensive, as it involved four persons, a single drug
transport incident, a relatively short duration of drug dealing, and involved a quarterkilogram of crack.147 Similarly, the court in Tai148 determined the criminal activity
was not otherwise extensive because it involved only three participants and the
unwitting services of two other individuals with no other circumstances.149
V. NUMEROSITY TEST AS THE LEGAL STANDARD
The numerosity test ought to be the legal standard for “otherwise extensive
criminal activity” determinations under the scope clause of the Sentencing
Guideline’s aggravating role adjustment. The numerosity approach must be the
standard for a variety of reasons. First, this standard best complies with the language
of the provision and the Sentencing Commission’s intent in establishing the
adjustment. Second, it best aligns with the purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act
and the Sentencing Guidelines. Third, this approach best follows the structure of the
Sentencing Guidelines and the procedure a judge must conduct to calculate the
applicable guideline range. Lastly, it prevents factors already considered in
increasing the offense level in other Guidelines from being double counted. This
Section will present each argument in turn.
A.

Language of the Sentencing Guideline

The language of Sentencing Guideline § 3B1.1(a) and (b) best supports the
numerosity approach as opposed to the totality of the circumstances approach. The
provision requires the sentencing judge to make two findings: (1) a role
determination, and (2) a scope determination.150 The role determination pertains to
whether or not there are sufficient factual findings to support the conclusion that the
defendant was a leader, organizer, supervisor, or manager of the criminal activity.
The scope determination regards the size of the criminal activity. The clause
explicitly provides two options for the criminal activity to satisfy the scope
requirement—either by the number of participants or by the activity being “otherwise
extensive.”151 Although the provision does not provide a clear definition of what it
means by “otherwise extensive,” there is enough information provided in the
guideline to determine which factors district court judges are allowed to consider and
which factors exceed the scope of the adjustment. The permissible factors point
towards a numerosity analysis.
First, the background commentary of the aggravating role adjustment clearly
states that the primary concern behind the inclusion of the adjustment provision is to
ensure that the defendant’s sentence is proportional to his or her level of

147
148
149
150
(2018).
151

Id. at *15–16.
United States v. Tai, 41 F.3d 1170 (7th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1175.
GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 15 at § 3B1.1(a)–(b); see also 21 AM. JUR. 2D, Criminal Law § 771
GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 15, at § 3B1.1(a)–(b) (2018).
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responsibility in the commission of the offense.152 Specifically, the adjustment
should only be applied based upon “the size of a criminal organization (i.e., the
number of participants in the offense) and the degree to which the defendant was
responsible for committing the offense.”153 From this language, it can reasonably be
drawn that the role determination derives from the degree of responsibility prong,
whereas the scope determination derives from the size of the organization prong.
Therefore, in order to best accord with a size analysis, the court ought to limit its
inquiry to the number of individuals involved in the criminal scheme––participants
and unknowing outsiders. If a broader totality of the circumstances inquiry were
performed, then factors that do not demonstrate the size of the organization would be
considered. For example, the amount of money that was fraudulently obtained––a
factor that the opposing circuits consider––has no bearing on, or is not a clear
indicator of, the size of the organization because a defendant in a two-person
conspiracy can obtain $4 million just like a defendant in a twenty-person conspiracy
can obtain that same amount. Consequently, the adjustment could be applied in
situations where the size of the organization was small, which was not the provision’s
intent. The aggravating role adjustment is meant to enhance the defendant’s sentence
when the size of the organization increases, which in turn, increases the significance
of the defendant’s role.154
Furthermore, the language of the adjustment makes no reference to the factors
that are considered by the circuits that follow the totality of the circumstances
approach. In particular, Application Note 3 clarifies the meaning of “otherwise
extensive” by explaining that an organization that involves less than five participants
can be considered extensive if it involved the “unknowing services” of other
persons.155 In other words, the adjustment is applicable even if there are not five
participants, if the unknowing services of other persons amount to the functional
equivalent of five participants. Thus, the provision’s language explicitly responds to
the size of the criminal organization concerning the number of both participants and
unknowing outsiders. The Application Notes do not refer to other factors, besides
the number of participants and unknowing outsiders, that might potentially increase
the severity of the criminal organization’s activity or the potential harm it might
cause. Therefore, if the Sentencing Commission intended for a broader analysis than
one limited strictly to the size of the organization, it is free to add language to the
provision to do so. However, as the language of the provision currently stands, the
aggravating role adjustment is concerned with the size of the criminal organization
and the role of the defendant. Thus, the “extensiveness” inquiry ought to be limited
to the factors expressed in the adjustment guideline––the number of participants and
the unknowing services of other persons.

152
153
154
155

Id. at § 3B1.1 cmt. background; see also 21 AM. JUR. 2D, Criminal Law § 771 (2018).
GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 15, at § 3B1.1 cmt. background.
Id.
Id. at § 3B1.1 cmt. n. 3.
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Goals and Purpose of Sentencing and the Guidelines

The numerosity approach best aligns with the purposes of both sentencing and
the Sentencing Guidelines as advanced in the SRA. First, the SRA intended for the
Sentencing Guidelines to promote transparency, predictability, and fairness in
sentencing and to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities. The numerosity approach
would achieve these goals––it provides a strict test that is transparent and will lead
to predictable determinations of whether the aggravating role adjustment would
apply. This test considers the same three criteria each time. Consequently, under
this approach, different judges would reach the same determination regarding
whether or not the criminal activity was “otherwise extensive” for the same
defendant. Furthermore, this approach promotes fairness, as the defendant’s sentence
would increase in proportion to the significance of his role in the criminal activity.
In contrast, the totality of the circumstances approach does not have a set test and
judges have discretion to look at a wide variety of factors to establish
“extensiveness.” There is no clear line of when a certain factor––such as the amount
of funds illegally obtained in the fraud, the geographic scope, or the number of
victims––indicates that the criminal activity was “otherwise extensive” under this
broader inquiry. Thus, different sentencing judges can make different factual
findings regarding the “extensiveness” prong in the same case. As a result,
unwarranted disparities result where the adjustment is applied in one court but is not
applied in a similar case in a different court. Furthermore, it creates similarities
between defendants who were not similar. For instance, the adjustment can apply to
a defendant who was a leader of a criminal organization with one participant and the
services of two unknowing persons—that involved $1 million in illegally obtained
funds over a three year period and crossed six states—as well as a defendant who
was a leader of a criminal organization with three participants and the involvement
of fourteen others.156 As shown, this approach improperly created a similarity
between those defendants because the adjustment is supposed to be applied in
accordance to the size of the organization that the defendant led, organized, managed,
or supervised and not the amount of harm or the effect the criminal organization had
on the public—different guidelines take into account those harms. Here, however,
the adjustment was applied in the first situation due to the amount of harm, its
duration, and the geographic reach of the organization. A leader of a small
organization is considered as relatively responsible as a leader of a large
organization––the opposite result of what the aggravating role adjustment was
created to address. Therefore, the totality of the circumstances test should not be the
court’s line of inquiry to determine “extensiveness.”

156 Compare United States v. Sosa, 777 F.3d 1279, 1301–02 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that a Medicaid
fraud scheme was otherwise extensive where the defendant recruited at least a dozen patients, falsified medical
records, submitted more than $1 million in false claims in just three months, and received almost $119,000),
with United States v. Bennett, 161 F.3d 171, 194 (3d Cir. 1998) (determining that the large and complex Ponzi
scheme the defendant ran to be extensive because it involved two participants and at least thirteen
nonparticipants who assisted the defendant by withholding information from investors and legitimizing his
activities by preparing reports based on false information).
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Moreover, the numerosity approach best ensures that the sentence imposed is
“sufficient, but not greater than necessary to meet the purposes of sentencing”:
retribution,157 deterrence,158 incapacitation,159 and rehabilitation.160 Regarding
retribution, the aggravating role adjustment was designed to “reflect the seriousness
of the offense,” as the severity of the defendant’s role increases with the size of the
criminal activity. Thus, to account for this increase in severity, defendants who held
a leadership or supervisory role in a larger criminal organization should receive a
greater sentence than a defendant who led or supervised a few individuals. The
numerosity approach limits the applicability of the enhancement to large criminal
activity while the totality of the circumstances approach allows the enhancement to
be applied to small criminal organizations. In addition, the numerosity test will
provide adequate deterrence, as defendants will not want to have a leadership or
management role in a large criminal enterprise for fear of a three or four point
increase in the offense level. Furthermore, it has the potential to prevent the
establishment of large criminal enterprises that create a greater danger to the
community. Thus, the numerosity approach will best achieve the goals set out in the
SRA.
C. Structure of the Sentencing Guidelines and Double Counting
Finally, the numerosity approach best complies with the overall structure of the
Sentencing Guidelines and prevents double counting of sentencing factors. As
mentioned in Part II and Part III, the Guidelines are structured such that a judge
proceeds chronologically through Chapter Two to Chapter Five to arrive at the
applicable sentence range unless the circumstances make the Chapter Seven
provisions relevant. Therefore, prior to considering the Chapter Three aggravating
role adjustment, a judge has already performed the Chapter Two analysis, considered
all relevant conduct in regard to “specific offense characteristics,” and applied all
aggravating or mitigating departures from the base offense level that were specific to
the offense. By the time the judge gets to Chapter Three adjustments, he or she is
supposed to only consider general aggravating or mitigating circumstances that have
not previously been considered. Thus, an aggravating factor must apply generally
and not be specific to the offense at hand.
However, the totality of the circumstances approach considers factors that were
already considered in prior guidelines such as the amount of money obtained, the
number of victims, the geographic reach of the criminal activity, and the amount of
drugs. Therefore, it double counts conduct that had already raised or decreased the

157 The sentence imposed needs to impart retribution for the offense by “reflect[ing] the seriousness of the
offense, . . . promoting respect for the law, and . . . provid[ing] just punishment for the offense.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) (2012).
158 The sentence imposed needs “to afford adequate deterrence” to both the offender and the public. Id.
§ 3553(a)(2)(B).
159 The sentence imposed needs to incapacitate “to protect the public from further crimes.” Id.
§ 3553(a)(2)(C).
160 The sentence imposed needs to rehabilitate by “provid[ing] the defendant with needed . . . correctional
treatment.” Id. § 3553(a)(2)(D).
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offense level previously. For example, assume a defendant was convicted for fraud
under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 with a base offense level of seven.161 That base offense level
can be increased based on the amount of loss, the extent of planning, and the number
of victims. Suppose the loss was above $1.5 million but less than $3.5 million. The
base offense level would increase by sixteen levels raising it to twenty-three.162 In
addition, the base offense level is raised by two levels for involving ten or more
victims163 and by an additional two levels for using sophisticated means164 to a base
offense level of twenty-seven. Furthermore, the USSG § 3B1.1(a) aggravating role
adjustment would be applied and would raise the base offense level by an additional
four levels to a base offense level of thirty-one for serving a leadership role in
“otherwise extensive” criminal activity because the criminal activity involved one
participant and fifteen victims, the illegal obtainment of $3 million, and the use of
sophisticated means. In other words, the aggravating role adjustment resulted in a
four level increase even though the factors that resulted in the determination that the
criminal activity was otherwise extensive had already raised the offense level by
twenty levels in the Chapter Two specific offense aggravating circumstances
analysis. Assuming the defendant would have received a criminal history category
of one, the guideline range with the aggravating role adjustment and Chapter Two
departures would have resulted in a sentence of 108 to 135 months instead of seventy
to eighty-seven months without the adjustment and only the Chapter Two departures.
That is a significant difference of thirty-eight to forty-eight months, or more
commonly, approximately three to four years of imprisonment. As demonstrated
through this example, a defendant could possibly receive multiple sentence
enhancements for the same aspects of the crime under the totality approach. Even
though each provision is arguably intended to address different harms, the same
conduct and harm is double counted under multiple provisions.
On the other hand, the numerosity approach prevents double counting by
focusing only upon the number of persons involved and the size of the criminal
organization. Thus, it accounts for conduct that has not already been considered in
previous Chapter Two specific offense guidelines. Specifically, the inquiry is limited
to the role the defendant played and the size of the organization––the number of
participants and the number of unknowing persons whose services were necessary
and peculiar to the criminal activity––which has not already been factored into the
sentencing calculation. It does not recount factors that indicate the criminal activity
was harmful but do not indicate that the criminal organization was large.165

161 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 15, at § 2B1.1(a).
162 Id. at § 2B1.1(b)(1).
163 Id. at § 2B1.1(b)(2).
164 Id. at § 2B1.1(b)(10).
165 Compare United States v. Kent, 821 F.3d 362, 37071 (2d Cir. 2016) (finding that the district court
considered impermissible factors outside the scope of the “numerosity” test and factors that have already been
taken into account in calculating the defendant’s offense level), with United States v. Diekemper, 604 F.3d 345,
354 (7th Cir. 2010) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the district court improperly double counted factors
considered in a previous sentencing enhancement in determining “extensiveness,” including the amount of
money obtained, the sophistication in the plan, and the number of victims).
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In addition, the narrow inquiry follows the procedure of the guidelines by only
considering general offense characteristics that can be applied universally across all
offense types. The number of participants and the number of unknowing persons––
whose services are necessary and peculiar to the criminal activity––can be applied
generally, whereas factors that are considered under the totality of the circumstances
approach, such as the amount of money fraudulently obtained and the amount of
drugs, cannot be applied to all offense types but are only applicable to certain types
of offenses. Therefore, the totality test permits a Chapter Two analysis for a Chapter
Three adjustment, which is not the proper procedure that a judge ought to follow––a
judge is to proceed chronologically through the chapters.
In sum, the numerosity approach best complies with the overall structure of the
Guidelines by proceeding chronologically and by limiting its inquiry to general
offense characteristics as opposed to broadening the inquiry to a Chapter Two
specific offense characteristics analysis. As a result, it prevents double counting
factors that have already resulted in a sentencing enhancement during the Chapter
Two analysis.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was enacted by Congress to establish set
principles and guidelines in federal sentencing law. The Sentencing Guidelines were
created with the purpose of establishing a transparent sentencing procedure that
provided proportionate, consistent, and fair sentences that reflected the seriousness
of the offense. This Note discussed the Chapter Three aggravating role adjustment,
which was designed to enhance a defendant’s sentence based on his or her relative
responsibility. Specifically, it was meant to account for the increase in the
significance of the defendant’s role resulting from the size of the criminal
organization. The ambiguity surrounding what constitutes “otherwise extensive
criminal activity” for purposes of the aggravating role adjustment has resulted in a
current circuit split. However, the numerosity test is the proper approach for a variety
of reasons.
First, the numerosity approach best aligns with the language of the adjustment
itself. The inquiry is limited to a headcount analysis of the number of participants
and the number of unknowing persons whose services were necessary and peculiar
to the criminal activity. Thus, the “extensiveness” determination is confined to
criminal activity that amounts to the equivalent of five participants, which accords to
the explicit language of the provision. The provision does not make reference to the
other factors that are improperly considered under the totality of the circumstances
approach, which impermissibly expand the inquiry beyond a functional equivalence
test. Therefore, the numerosity approach restricts the inquiry to what the Sentencing
Commission intended.
Secondly, this approach best comports with the purposes of sentencing set out in
the SRA. The strict three factor test prevents unwarranted disparities and ensures
predictability and consistency in sentences because the same analysis is performed
each time; however, the totality of the circumstances approach affords judges wide
discretion in the factors they can consider, which can vary from case-to-case and
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judge-to-judge. Furthermore, this test promotes the purposes of sentencing, as it
adequately deters defendants from serving in a leadership or supervisory role in large
criminal organizations for fear of a significant increase in their term of imprisonment,
which in turn can reduce the number of large criminal organizations. In addition, it
reflects the seriousness of the offense, as the severity of the defendant’s role increases
with the size of the criminal activity.
Lastly, this test best complies with the structure of the Sentencing Guidelines and
prevents double counting factors that have already resulted in an increase or decrease
in the base offense level. The inquiry is limited under the numerosity approach to
the general offense characteristics regarding the number of people involved in the
criminal activity. These factors are universally applied across offense types and their
applicability does not depend on the offense of conviction. On the other hand, the
totality of the circumstances approach considers specific offense characteristics that
were considered in the Chapter Two analysis regarding the particular offense of
conviction. The totality test proceeds backwards when the Guidelines are structured
to be forward-looking.
By contemplating Chapter Two specific offense
characteristics, it double counts factors resulting in a second sentencing enhancement
based on the same harm. Because the numerosity approach only considers general
offense characteristics and does not look back to Chapter Two characteristics, the
Sentencing Guidelines procedure is properly followed and does not double count
provisions.
In conclusion, the circuits ought to adopt the numerosity approach’s three-prong
166
test in determining when criminal activity is “otherwise extensive” for the reasons
set forth above.

166 “(1) The number of knowing participants, (2) the number of unknowing participants whose activities
were organized, led, [managed, or supervised] by the defendant with specific criminal intent, [and] (3) the extent
to which the services of the nonparticipants were peculiar and necessary to the criminal scheme.” United States
v. Carrozzella, 105 F.3d 796, 803–04 (2d Cir. 1997).

